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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Although the United States Supreme Court has not expressly
ruled on the question, it appears that a decree of adoption, rendered
with proper jurisdiction and without fraud on the court, is entitled
to normal full faith and credit protection for all purposes. 3' But
such a judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive
or final effect in a sister state than in the rendering state.3 2 Before
grantifig full faith and credit to the decree, a sister state may demand
proof that the adoptions were valid under the law-of the state granting the adoption.3 3
Since the North Carolina court has never had occasion to interpret the word "residence" in our adoption statute, it would be
unfortunate if a sister state should seize upon the decision in Martin
as a basis for refusing to give full faith and credit to a child adopted
by a serviceman in North Carolina. Until either the United States
Supreme Court or the North Carolina Supreme Court interprets
residence in regard to adoption, an attorney would be well advised
to get into the record evidence sufficient to support a finding of bona
fide domicile of the adopting parent. And in cases where it is clear
that the adopting parents are not domiciled in North Carolina, it
would seem advisable for the attorney to inform them of the possible
"pitfalls" that they might face later.
C. EDWIN ALLMAN, JR.

Federal Income Taxation-Deductibility of Meal and Lodging
Expenses as Medical Care
It is probable that during any given year a large number of
people in the United States will encounter sickness or injury and
will be advised by their physician to take a trip entiriely for medical
treatment. Since certain medical expenses are deductible for income
tax purposes,' there arises a question as to what trip expenses may
be properly classified as a medical care deduction. This is especially
true when the taxpayer is not confined to a hospital or other institution and is accompanied on the trip by his wife and, possibly,
Smith, 94 Ind. App. 619, 180 N.E. 188 (1932); Heirich v. Howe, 50 N.M.
90, 171 P.2d 312 (1946) ; Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 199 S.E. 677 (1938).
" 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICr OF LAWS: A ComPAPATivw STUDY 645 (1945);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS § 143 (1934).

New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614 . (1947).
Welkh v. Jacobsmeyer, 216 La. 334, 43 So. 2d 678 (1949).
INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §213(a).
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his dependents.2 Recently two taxpayers brought this precise'.question to the courts for clarification and received conflicting results.
In Commissioner v. Bilder3 the petitioner, who lived, in New
Jersey, suffered from a long history of heart trouble and was advised
by his physician to spend the winter months in a warm climate.
Following this advice, the petitioner, his wife and his three-year-old
daughter rented an apartment and spent the winter months of. 1954
and 1955 in Florida. On his tax returns for these years be took as
a medical care deduction -the full amount of the apartment rental
and his transportation costs. He did not include any deduction for
meals. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency for the stated deductions, and the Tax Court reversed. The Tax Court allowed his
. transportation costs in full but only one-third of the total apartment
rentals since it was not shown that the taxpayer needed his family
*on the trip as a part of the medical treatment. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit vacated the judgment of the Tax Court and
remanded. The court of appeals' approved not only his transportation deduction.but all of the deduction for apartment rentals, finding
that it was necessary for the petitioner's family to accompany him
on the trip for proper treatment of the disease.
Carasso v. Commissioner involved a taxpayer who had been
stricken by a serious illness that resulted in the removal of a major
part of his stomach. On his doctor's recommendation the taxpayer
and, his ,wife, in 1956, flew from their home in New York, to
Bermuda'for convalescence. On his tax return for 195.6, the taxpayer took a medical care deduction for hotel, meals, transportation
'and exit -tax.7expen~es which he and his wife incurred on the trip.
The Tax Court' found that his wife's presence was essential and
allowedtie total deduction claimed with the exception of the expenses
for the'hotel rental and meals. On appeal by the taxpayer, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
The real conflict arising from these cases evolves around the
definition of 'medical care." The medical care deduction was first
introduced in 1942 as section 23(x) of the Code of 1939, and at
2 If the taxpayer is an in-patient at a hospital or other qualified institution
(as determined by the treasury regulation's), it is quite clear that he will be
allowed a deduction for the costs of his meals and lodging furnished therein.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(v) (1957). "
'289 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961), cert.' granted, 30 U.S.L. WzE i 3154
(U.S. Nov. 14, 1961) (No. 384).
'292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961).
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that time the term was broadly defined. 5 Taken in conjunction with
section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code,' it was possible to include as
extraordinary medical expenses certain expenditures which would
normally fall into the category of personal, living, or family expenses. These two sections were interpreted to permit deductions
in proper situations for meals and lodging while on a trip for
medical reasons. 7 The Commissioner had acquiesced in this interpretation.8
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 replaced section 23(x) of
the 1939 Code with section 213. It provides an identical definition
for medical care except for the specific addition of transportation
expenses incurred in connection with medical care. In addition the
1954 Code replaced section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code with section
262,"0 which provides in effect that no deduction can be taken for
personal, living, or family expenses unless expressly provided by the
Code. Unlike its predecessor, section 262 makes no mention of
extraordinary medical expenses being an exception to this rule.
5
INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 23(x) (2), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 825
(1942), provided: "The term 'medical care,' as used in this subsection, shall
include amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or pre-

vention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function
of the body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance)."
"The term 'medical care' is broadly defined to include amounts paid for

the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body. It is not intended, however, that a deduction should be allowed for any. expense that is
not incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or
mental defect or illness." S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96

(1942).

'INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §24(a) (1), as amended, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 826
(1942): "In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed

in respect of-(1) Personal, living, or family expenses, except extraordinary
medical expenses deductible under section 23(x) ..."

Embry's Estate v. Gray, 143 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1956), appeal
dismissed on motionr of appellant-DistrictDirectorof Internal Revenue, 244
F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1957); Stanley D. Winderman, 32 T.C. 1197 (1959);
Bertha M. Rodgers, 25 T.C. 254 (1955); L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C.
580 (1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950); Edward A. Havey, 12
T.C. 409 (1949).
'Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(x)-i (1943); Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 Cum.
BULL. 307.
"INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 213(e): "Definitions-for purposes of this

section-(1) The term 'medical care' means amounts paid-(A) for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (including amounts
paid for accident or health insurance), or (B) for transportation primarily
for and essential to medical care referred to in subparagraph (A)."
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262.
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The Senate and House Committee Reports on section 262 indicate that no substantive change in section 24(a) (1) was intended
to be made." In connection with section 213(e), which includes
the definition for medical care, the House and Senate Committee
Reports indicate that a new definition of medical care was intended,
and that this new definition should include regulations already in
effect plus a deduction for transportation costs incurred on a trip
prescribed for health, but "not the ordinary living expenses incurred
during such a trip."'" They specifically pointed out that no deduction was to be allowed for meals and lodging while on a trip for
medical purposes. An example was given which contemplated a fact
situation similar to that found in the two principal cases. 8
The Treasury Regulations which correspond to the aforementioned two sections of the Code merely affirm the intent shown in the
committee reports. The regulations pertaining to section 262 point
out that certain items of a personal, living, or family nature are
deductible under some sections of the Code (section 213 is one of
those listed) but only to the extent expressly provided under the
particular section and the regulations to that section. 4 The regulations under section 213 (e) of the Code provide that the cost of any
meals and lodging while away from home receiving medical treatment, except in an institution, shall not be a deductible expense.
However, the cost of transportation for such a trip essential to the
rendition of medical care is considered an expense paid for medical
care.

15

Generally, when the courts are called upon to interpret statutes,
the language of the statutes is construed "so as to give effect to the
" S. Rr. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1954); H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A65 (1954).
2
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954).
"8"The deduction permitted for 'transportation primarily for and essential
to medical care' clarifies existing law in that it specifically excludes deduction of any meals and lodging while away from home receiving medical
treatment. For example, if a doctor prescribes that a patient must go to
Florida in order to alleviate specific chronic ailments and to escape unfavorable climatic conditions which have proven injurious to the health of
the taxpayer, and the travel is prescribed for reasons other than the general
improvement of a patient's health, the cost of the patient's transportation to
Florida would be deductible but not his living expenses while there." S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A60 (1954).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(c) (1958).
"6Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (iv) (1957).
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intent of Congress."'
It is presently the thought that the proper
meaning "can only be derived from a considered weighing of every
relevant aid to construction."' 17 The Supreme Court has further
said that "words are inexact tools at best, and for that reason
there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on superficial examination.' ,
This trend of thought has been extended
to tax cases, and it is no longer the rule that all doubts are to be
construed in favor of the taxpayer. 9
In the Bilder case the Tax Court refused to consider the congressional intent of section 213 because it felt that the section was
virtually the same as section 23(x), except for the reference to
transportation expenses."
In its opinion the Tax Court cited
previous cases 2- decided by it on this question under section 23 (x)
of the 1939 Code and held that these prior decisions governed the
instant case. However, the court failed to recognize that in each
case cited as being pertinent, section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code
was discussed as being necessarily read in conjunction with section
23 (x) in order to provide deductions for meal and lodging expenses
in proper cases. 22 Thus it seems that the Tax Court made two
basic errors: (1) it failed to look to the legislative history of section
213; and (2) it failed to take into consideration the fact that section
262 must be read together with section 213 in order to properly
consider the question presented in the principal case.
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1939).
'United States v. Dickerson,
310 U.S. 554, .562 (1939). See also
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955). Earlier decisions invoked the "plain meaning rule" and would not look to legislative history where the terms of the

statute were clear. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
385, 396 (1868).
" Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1942).
11White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938).
"Robert M. Bilder, 33 T.C. 155, 158 (1959). In a previous case the
court did consider the congressional committee reports and stated: "[T]he
committee reports . . . clearly show a congressional intent to codify the

preexisting [sic] concepts of medical care." Frank S. Delp, 30 T.C. 1230,
1235 (1958). This was done in spite of the fact that the reports said a new
definition for "medical expenses" was intended.

The new definition would

not have affected that particular case, but it would play an important role
in the case now under consideration.
" L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580 (1949); Edward A. Havey, 12
T.C. 409 (1949).
" L. Keever Stringham, supra note 21, at 583-84; Edward A. Havey,
supra note 21, at 411-12. See also Bertha M. Rodgers, 25 T.C. 254, 259

(1955).
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When the Bilder case reached the court of appeals, the majority,
like the Tax Court, did not discuss section 262. In the opinion
of the dissenting judge this was pointed out as being their "fundamental mistake."2 The majority, however, did consider the committee reports accompanying section 213, but they drew the conclusion that the reports were ambiguous and made for confusion, not
clarification. The, majority felt that if Congress had wanted to
limit the deduction as the Commissioner contended, they should have
done so in clear and express terms. In the absence of this unequivocal language in the statute itself, the court said:
[S]ince Section 213(a), (e)(1)(A) of the 1954 Code is a
re-enactment of Section 23(x) of the 1939 Code, and the
courts (and the Commissioner) over a twelve year period
had construed Section 23 (x) to permit allowance of lodging
and meals as "medical expenses" where they were incurred as
"medical care," "the long and well-settled construction" of
Section 23 (x), plus its re-enactment without change of "the
established interpretation" provide "most persuasive indications" that the judicial construction "has become part of the
warp and woof" of Section 213.24
In the Carasso case the Tax Court modified the position it took
in the Bilder case to the extent that it disapproved its own failure
to examine the legislative history of section Z13.2" However, the
Tax Court still failed to mention section 262, and it refused to
express an opinion whether or not meals and lodging would be
deductible if the circumstances were different.2" The court of appeals
noted the change in section 262 from that of 24(a) (1), and tie
similarity between section 213 and 23(x). The court then questioned whether these changes indicated an intent on the part of
Congress to change the interpretation applied under the 1939 Code.
the court stated that the language of 'these sections really did not
conclusively answer this question and that a resort to the committee reports was necessary. By an examination of these reports the
court found language which clearly indicated that the intent of
"' Commissioner v. Bilder, 289 F.2d 291, 307 (3d Cir. 1961).
"I Id. at 303.
"5Max Carasso, 34 T.C. 1139 (1960).
"This decision was handed down before the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals handed down its opinion in the Bilder case, and two judges dissented.
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Congress was to prohibit a deduction for meals and lodging in
situations like the one in question.
It is submitted that the preferable construction is that followed by
the court in Carasso and suggested by the dissenting judge in Bilder.
Using this rule under the new sections, only transportation costs
are deductible while meals and lodging are not. The probable
reason for the legislative limitation on the meal and lodging deduction was the abuse of it by taxpayers who were using the provision
as a means of obtaining "tax deductible vacations." But it certainly seems that the trips taken by the taxpayers in the two principal cases would fall into a "necessity" category, and that the costs
incurred, while of a personal living expense nature, were "extraordinary" medical expenses. Perhaps Congress did, as the majority
suggested in the Bilder case, become entangled in sweeping terms
which prohibited a deduction in cases where the trip was essential
to the health of the taxpayer. However, the language of the statutes
and of the committee reports is too strong to be subject to judicial
construction in favor of the taxpayer, and only Congress by new
legislation can correct the non-allowance of this justifiable deduction.
H.

ARTHUR SANDMAN

Partnerships-Profit Sharing by Lender
Should a corporation which lends money to another corporation
be held a partner of the latter where the loan is secured, the lender
is to be repaid the principal and interest and is to share in the
borrower's profits? The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with this question in Minute Maid Corp. v. United Foods, Inc.'
United Foods, a broker of frozen foods, was an authorized
direct buyer of products packaged by Minute Maid Corporation.
By receiving notice of price increases a considerable time in advance,
United Foods could realize a speculative profit on inventories in addition to substantial volume discounts and allowances if it had sufficient
financial resources to buy large quantities. United Foods, not having
sufficient funds nor normal credit sources to make such purchases,
entered into a written agreement with United States Cold Storage
Corporation. The agreement provided: (1) Cold Storage would
lend money to United Foods to purchase foods; (2) the purchased
'291 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1961).

